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Unjust enrichment claim of national authorities restricted 
ECJ Judgment C-398/09 Lady & Kid of 6 September 2011 
Dr N.A. De Vos 
Assistant Professor at the Department of Public law, Jurisprudence and Legal History,  
Tilburg Law School  
 
This article discusses the ECJ judgment in case C-398/09 Lady & Kid. The principle of unjust 
enrichment has its roots in private law. In this case it is applied in a public law context to the 
advantage of the Danish government. Under the existing jurisprudence of the ECJ, a Member 
State can apply its own national principle of unjust enrichment within the requirements of 
equivalence and effectiveness in order to refuse the reimbursement of a tax levied contrary to 
Union law. It is remarkable that in the Lady & Kid case the ECJ does not mention these 
requirements explicitly. This could be an illustration of the increasing convergence between 
the European and national unjust enrichment theory within the scope of Union law. The ECJ 
clearly indicates how unjust enrichment must be understood in national procedures in order to 
limit its use by the government to the disadvantage of citizens. Unjust enrichment must be 
interpreted narrowly and only the direct passing on of tax unlawfully levied can constitute an 
exception to the subjective right of reimbursement of unduly levied tax.  
 
Introduction 
Unjust enrichment is a concept that has its origin in private law. It could be defined as a 
principle that states that when a person obtains unjustified enrichment causing loss to another, 
this person is forced to reverse the enrichment.
1
 The principle of unjust enrichment can be 
found in the legal orders of several Member States and at the Union level.
2
 However, unjust 
enrichment traditionally does not fall under the scope of EU legislation. It is mainly 
developed and demarcated in EU case law. Unjust enrichment is also applied in a public law 
context,
3
 for example in reimbursement proceedings of taxes or charges levied in breach of 
Union law and recovery proceedings of unlawful European subsidies and state aid. In the 
absence of full Europeanisation such proceedings mainly take place at the national level 
(indirect application of Union law). Citizens or Member States can thus invoke their national 
principle of unjust enrichment in a national procedure against recovery or reimbursement.  
Lady & Kid reveals that unjust enrichment must be defined in a rather narrow sense when it is 
used by the government to the disadvantage of its citizens in order to refuse the 
reimbursement of taxes or charges levied in breach of Union law.  
                                                          
1
 http://www.sgecc.net. The Study Group on a European Civil Code published ‘The Principles of European 
Unjustified Enrichment law’ where enrichment is described in a rather broad sense (f.ex. transferable and non-
transferable enrichment, disadvantage, etc.). 
2
 See J. Gordley, Foundations of Private law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford 2007); V. 
Sagaert, ‘Unjust enrichment and change of position’ [2004] MJ 159-186; J.M. Smits, ‘The principle of Unjust 
enrichment and Formation of contract: the Importance of a Hidden Policy Factor’ [2006] ERPL 423-435 and S. 
Swann & C. von Bar, Principles of European law, Unjustified enrichment (Oxford 2010). 
3




The facts of the case Lady & Kid 
By law of 18 December 1987, the Danish Government introduced a business tax known as the 
employment market contribution (‘the Ambi’). The rate of the Ambi was fixed at 2.5% and 
was charged on the imported goods’ full sale price upon first sale in Denmark. In return for 
the introduction of the Ambi, a couple of social charges on employers which had to be paid by 
Danish enterprises had been abolished. The purpose of this measure was to stimulate 
employment without having an impact on the public finances by eliminating the link between 
the contributions paid and the number of employees. Importing enterprises contested the 
legality of the tax before the Danish Eastern Regional Court (Østre Landsret) and this Court 
made a preliminary reference to the ECJ on the compatibility of the measure with EU law. By 
the judgment in the case C-200/90 Dansk Denkavit and Poulsen Trading
,4
 the Court held that 
the Ambi was incompatible with EU law in particular with Article 33 of the Sixth Council 
Directive.
5
 Consequently, the Danish government enacted in May 1992 a law that laid down 
the arrangements for reimbursement of the Ambi unlawfully levied. However, the law laid 
down some restrictions to the reimbursement in Articles 1 and 2: 
 
Article 1: ‘It shall be decided according to the general rules of Danish law whether, 
and in the particular case, to what extent there is a claim for reimbursement or 
compensation in connection with the amounts which have been paid into the State 
Treasury pursuant to Law No 840 of 18 December 1987 on the employment market 
contribution, as amended.’ 
Article 2: ‘… (2) The amount claimed shall be specified and reasons shall be given 
therefore, and it shall be accompanied by documentation which makes it possible to 
assess in detail whether the party subject to the contribution has suffered a loss.’ 
 
The Law of 1992 was supplemented by Bulletin No 122 of July 1996, which laid down the 
conditions to be met by the enterprises that sought reimbursement. In particular, the 
enterprises must have saved less in employer social security contributions than they had paid 
by way of the Ambi even if there has been no price increases. The four applicants in the case 
Lady & Kid all four of whom were active in retail trade had asked for repayment of the Ambi. 
Their applications for reimbursement had been rejected on the ground that they had saved 
more money during the period that they had to pay the Ambi because of the fact that the 
abolished employer social security contributions exceeded the Ambi paid. The enterprises had 
thus been able to fully cover the Ambi paid. 
The applicants then sought annulment of these decisions and the Eastern Regional 
Court again decided to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ on the compatibility of the 
Danish rules regarding reimbursement of the Ambi with Union Law. The main question was 
whether unjust enrichment could follow from a saving made as a result of the concomitant 
                                                          
4
 Case C-200/90 Dansk Denkavit and Poulsen Trading [1992] ECR I-2217. 
5
 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 




abolition of other levies charged on a different basis, in the case that the taxpayer had not 
altered its sale prices. 
 
The Advocate General’s Opinion 
 
The Advocate General Cruz Villalón stated that the entitlement to reimbursement of sums 
levied by Member States in breach of Union law
6
 is based on the rule of direct effect,
7
 in 
particular it is a consequence of the rights conferred on individuals by Union provisions 
prohibiting such charges. It is however for the national Courts and tribunals to ensure the 
legal protection that individuals derive from the direct effect of Union law (para 22 & 23).
8
 
Some case law of the ECJ confirmed that national law is not only applicable to the formal 
conditions of repayment but must also be applied to matters concerning time-limits, limitation 
periods and lapse of rights, interests and other matters regarding the repayment of sums 
unduly paid.
9
 However, national legislatures must respect the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness (para 24 to 27).    
Concerning unjust enrichment as ground for an exception to repayment of sums 
unduly paid, the AG referred to former case law. The ECJ stated in the case Just that when the 
burden of the charge levied but not due has been borne not to the trader but by the purchaser 
to whom the cost has been passed on, repayment of the trader would amount to unjust 
enrichment.
10
 A large number of judgments confirmed and refined - on the ground of the 
principle of effectiveness - this case law (para 29 to 34).
11
  
According to the AG, passing on of the burden of the charge to third parties and unjust 
enrichment are not separate cumulative requirements. However, this idea has become 
widespread because of the wording of certain judgments as if it were cumulative conditions.
12
 
Unjust enrichment is a ground for the exception on the right of reimbursement of such charges 
and passing on is one of its possible and most typical manifestations.
13
 According to the AG, 
the inclusion of the tax in the sale price (thus passing on) is not necessarily the only defense to 
the repayment of sums unduly paid.  Decisive is whether the repayment may actually give rise 
to unjust enrichment, because the tax has ultimately been paid by the buyer of the goods or 
because of other circumstances (para 40). Consequently, the repayment of tax may not give 
rise to unjust enrichment, even though the tax has been passed on, and, conversely, it may 
give rise to unjust enrichment even when passing on has not occurred (para 41).  
                                                          
6
 Case 6/60 Humblet/Belgium [1960] ECR 559. 
7
 Case 33/76 Rewe [1977] ECR 1989, para 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, para 12 & 13 and Case 
240/87 Deville [1988] ECR 3513, para 11. 
8
 See f.ex. Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, para 12 and Case C-188/95 Fantask and Others [1997] 
ECR I-6783, para 38. 
9
 F. ex. Case 130/79 Express Dairy Foods [1980] ECR 1887, para 11 and Case 811/79 Ariete [1980] ECR 2545, 
para 9. 
10
 Case 68/79 Just [1980] ECR 501. 
11
 F. ex. Case 61/79 Denkavit Italiana [1980] ECR 1205, para 26; Joined Cases 142/80 & 143/80 Essevi & 
Salengo [1981] ECR 1413, para 35 and Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb [1997] ECR I-165, para 
21. 
12
 Case C-147/01 Weber’s Wine World [2003] ECR I-11365, para 94. 
13
 Opinion A-G Cruz Villalón in Case Lady & Kid, para 38. 
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Being an exception to the general rule, refusal to reimburse sums unduly paid must be 
interpreted narrowly but this may not lead to a result whereby national regulations, which 
contemplate situations based on unjust enrichment other than passing on, are rejected (para 
43). In the Lady & Kid case the tax found to be unlawful is just one part of a package of 
national legislation that must be considered as a whole. According to the AG the exception of 
direct passing on does not provide a satisfactory response to this unprecedented case with 
special characteristics. For this particular case an ad hoc solution is needed (para 46 et seq.). 
  The AG considered ‘offsetting’ as a possible exception (as an alternative to passing 
on) to the entitlement to repayment. The AG referred to the cases Pigs and Bacon 
Commission (a year before Just) and case Apple and Pear Development Council where the 
ECJ stated that unlawful tax can possibly be ‘offset’ when the same person receives other 
economic advantages. It was up to the national court to assess whether the taxpayer’s debt 
could be ‘offset’ against other sums which had been paid.
14
 The application of offsetting is 
subject to several conditions. First, the parallel abolition of a lawful charge that is relied on 
must have a direct relationship of cause and effect with the charge held to be unlawful; second 
there must be a sufficient correlation between the group of persons benefiting from the 
abolition of the charges and the group of persons liable to pay the new charge and third the 
saving made must be quantifiable without too much severity, as the amount of the charge paid 
must, similarly, be quantifiable (para 57-75). According to the AG, Union law does not 
preclude a Member State from refusing to repay a tax levied in breach of Union law if the 
State can prove the offsetting and the fulfillment of the conditions mentioned above.  
  
Unjust enrichment according to the Court of Justice 
 
The Grand Chamber did not follow the lead of the Advocate General. The Court reiterated its 
standard jurisprudence concerning the right to a refund of charges levied in a Member State in 
breach of Union law. It stated that this right is the consequence and complement of the rights 
conferred on individuals by provisions of Union law prohibiting such charges. Member States 
are in principle obliged to repay charges levied in breach of Union law (para 17).
15
 
There is an exception to the principle of reimbursement of taxes incompatible with 
Union law namely where the repayment of a tax wrongly paid would entail unjust enrichment 
of the persons concerned. Unjust enrichment in its strict sense implies that the person required 
to repay taxes, charges or duties levied in breach of Union law has actually passed them on to 
other persons.
16
 In that case, repaying the trader would mean paying him twice over because 
he already received the amount of the charge from the purchaser to whom the cost has been 
passed on (para 18 and 19). 
However, the Court continues and states explicitly that the refusal to reimburse a tax 
levied on the sale of goods is a ‘limitation of a subjective right derived from the legal order of 
the European Union’. By consequence it must be interpreted ‘narrowly’ and only the direct 
                                                          
14
 Case 177/78 Pigs & Bacon Commission [1979] ECR 2161. 
15
 Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, para 12; Joined Cases C-441/98 and C-442/98 Michaïlidis [2000] 
ECR I-7145, para 30; Case C-309/06 Marks & Spencer [2008] ECR I-2283, para 35 and Case C-264/08 Direct 
Parcel Distribution Belgium [2010] ECR I-731, para 45.    
16
 Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb [1997] ECR I-165, para 21. 
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passing on of the tax wrongly levied on the purchases constitutes an exception to the right to 
reimbursement of tax levied in breach of Union law, and even the ‘sole exception’ (para 20). 
The Court also reiterated its findings in Comateb, Weber’s Wine World and 
Michaïlidis that passing on to third parties does not necessarily entail unjust enrichment.
17
 In 
particular where the charge is entirely incorporated in the price but the taxable person suffers 
as a result of a fall in the volume of his sales (para 21). 
The Court held that: 
 
  ‘22. Similarly, the Member State may not reject an application for reimbursement of 
an unlawful tax on the ground that the amount of that tax has been set off by the 
abolition of a lawful levy of an equivalent amount. 
23. Although reimbursement of an unlawful levy to a trader who has passed on the 
amount to his customers can, in the conditions set out above, lead to unjust 
enrichment, that is not so in the case of an alleged abolition of other taxes in relation to 
the introduction of a tax contrary to European Union law. 
24. That abolition falls within the ambit of choices made by the State in the field of 
taxation which express its general policy in economic and social matters. Such a 
choice can easily have the most diverse of consequences which, disregarding the 
potential difficulties in ascertaining whether and, if so, to what extent one tax has, in 
reality, purely and simply replaced another, preclude the reimbursement of an 
unlawful tax in such a context’s being regarded as giving rise to unjust enrichment.’  
 
 The Court referred to two Courts judgments McCarren and Apple Pear Development 
Council
18
 wherein was stated that the national court, applying its national law, could take into 
consideration possible methods of refusing reimbursement of an unlawful tax other than 
passing on. However, in the present judgment, the Court made clear that unjust enrichment 
understood as the direct passing on of the tax wrongly levied to the purchaser is the sole 
exception to the right of reimbursement of tax levied in breach of Union law. 
 The Court concluded (para 26): 
  
‘(…) Consequently, European Union law precludes a Member State from refusing 
reimbursement of a tax wrongfully levied on the ground that the amounts wrongly 
paid by the taxpayer have been set off by a saving made as a result of the concomitant 
abolition of other levies, since such a set-off cannot be regarded, from the point of 




                                                          
17
 Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb [1997] ECR I-165, para 29 to 32; Joined Cases C-441/98 and C-
442/98 Michaïlidis [2000] ECR I-7145, para 34 and 35 and Case C-147/01 Weber’s Wine World [2003] ECR I-
11365, para 98 and 99. 
18
 Case 177/78 McCarren [1979] ECR 2161, para 25 and Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council 
[1983] ECR 4083, para 41. 
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More than thirty years ago in the (Danish) Just case
19
 the ECJ opened up the possibility of 
refusing the repayment of an unlawfully levied tax in circumstances in which such repayment 
would entail the unjust enrichment of the person seeking repayment. This ECJ judgment has 
been seriously criticised.
20
 Many cases followed but up until now they were all cases where 
the cause of the unjust enrichment was that the unlawful charge has actually been passed on.  
The Lady & Kid case does not concern the direct passing on of an unlawfully levied tax. In 
this case the tax held to be unlawful is part of a legislative package by the (Danish) Member 
State and is ‘offset’ by the abolition of other lawful taxes.  
The phenomenon of disputing charges, which have been unlawfully levied is settled in 
the Member States in different ways. In certain Member States, claims of this type are subject 
to specific procedural conditions and certain time-limits under the law with regard to 
complaints submitted to the tax authorities and to legal proceedings for them. In many 
Member States, citizens cannot claim the repayment of unduly paid taxes after a certain time 
has expired. It is in this context that the ECJ in 1976 – in the cases Rewe and Comet – stated 
that there is nothing in European law that prevents a citizen who contests before a national 
court a decision of a national authority on the ground that is it is incompatible with European 
law from being confronted with the defense that a prescription term set by national law has 
expired. In other words, it is compatible with European law to lay down reasonable national 




In other legal systems – such as the Danish – claims for repayment of unduly paid 
charges must be brought to the ordinary courts by means of a claim for the refunding of sums 
paid but not owed. In Denmark, the action for recovery of the sums paid but not owed is 
subject in principle to a term of five years.
22
 
Due to the fact that there are no common European rules regarding the repayment of 
wrongfully levied taxes, the repayment can only be sought within the framework of 
substantive and formal conditions laid down in national laws (indirect application of Union 
law). In the absence of European rules on recovery of national taxes levied in breach of Union 
law, it is thus for the national legal order to designate the competent court and to lay down 
and apply the procedural rules of judicial proceedings to ensure the protection of rights which 
individuals derive from Union law.
23
 Member States have in principle the obligation on the 
ground of the principle of loyal cooperation – laid down in Article 4, Para 3, TEU – to repay 
to the individual the tax which has been levied though not due. 
However, Union law does not as such prevent a national legal system – for reasons of 
legal certainty – to disallow repayment of unduly paid charges where the reimbursement 
would entail unjust enrichment of the recipients. Already in the early 1980s, the ECJ 
recognised – in the case Just – that the use of a national principle of unjust enrichment in 
                                                          
19
 Case 68/79 Hans Just [1980] ECR 501. 
20
 See f.ex. F. Hubeau, ‘La répétition de l’indu en droit communautaire’ [1981] Revue trimestrielle de droit 
européen 448. 
21
 Case 33/76 Rewe [1977] ECR 1989, para 6; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043 and Case 68/79 Hans Just 
[1980] ECR 501. 
22
 Case 68/79 Hans Just [1980] ECR 501, para 24.
 




 See f.ex. Case C-147/01 Weber’s Wine World [2003] ECR I-11365, para 37. 
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order to refuse the reimbursement of unduly paid charges was not in breach of Union law.
24
 
National laws that prevent the reimbursement of charges in breach of Union law in the case 
that the unduly levied charges have been incorporated in the price of the goods and thus 
passed on to the purchaser cannot in principle be regarded as contrary to Union law.
25
  
Whilst in principle the ECJ recognises national procedural autonomy, it restrains the 
latter by the European requirements of equivalence and effectiveness.
26
 In earlier cases – for 
example Weber’s Wine World
27
 – the ECJ mentions these requirements explicitly. National 
conditions concerning repayment of charges contrary to Union law may not be less favourable 
than those relating to similar claims regarding national charges (equivalence). National rules 
and practices cannot hinder the full application of Union law by making the repayment of 
unlawful charges practically impossible or extremely difficult (effectiveness).
28
 It is for the 
national court to determine whether the procedural rule at issue is in breach of the principle of 
effectiveness
29
 taking into account principles as legal certainty (incl. unjust enrichment), 
rights of defense or the proper conduct of the procedure (rule of reason).
30
  
It is remarkable that in the Lady & Kid case the ECJ did not explicitly refer to the 
procedural autonomy or to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. In particular it is 
not very clear whether the ECJ wants the European principle of unjust enrichment or rather 
the national principle of unjust enrichment within European boundaries to be applied. This 
could be an apparition of the blurring boundary between direct and indirect application of 
Union law. The words of the AG Cruz Villalón can substantiate this statement. He stated in 
his opinion that the exception relating to passing on and unjust enrichment was, although 
adopted by the ECJ, originally a national rule. If Member States decide to apply the exception 
they must in doing so observe the conditions laid down by Union case law (para 44).  
One could say that the European and national principles are ‘converging’ within the 
scope of European law. This phenomenon could yet be noted in recovery proceedings in other 
domains (e.g. European subsidies).
31
 The ECJ seems to no longer worry about national 
procedural autonomy, direct or indirect application and thus application of a European or a 
national principle within European requirements. The ECJ simply defines a principle of legal 
certainty in a way which guarantees that European law is fully applied. 
 The judgment of Lady and Kid confirms earlier case law
32
 which states that repayment 
of tax levied by a Member State contrary to the rules of Union law is a consequence of, and 
                                                          
24
 Case 68/79 Hans Just [1980] ECR 501.  
25
 Case 68/79, Hans Just [1980] ECR 501 and Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595. 
26
 See J.H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law 
(Groningen 2007) 40-49.  
27
 Case C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World [2003] ECR I-11365. 
28
 Case 33/76 Rewe [1980] ECR 1989; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043; Case 61/79 Denkavit [1980] ECR 
1205 and Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595.  
29
 Case 240/87 Deville [1988] ECR 3513. 
30
 Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599; Joined Cases C-430/93 & C-431/93 Van Schijndel and van 
Veen [1995] ECR I-4705 and Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 Van der Weerd [2007] ECR I-4233.  
31
 Case C-185/06 ROM-projecten [2007] ECR I-5103 and Joined Cases C-383/06 – C-385/06 Vereniging 
Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening and Others [2008] ECR I-1561. See also Case C-508/03 
Commission/United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-3969 (planning permission). 
32
 Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb [1997] ECR I-165, para 20; Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-
410/98 Metallgesellschaft [2001] ECR I-1727, para 84; Case C-147/01 Weber’s Wine World [2003] ECR I-
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an adjunct to the rights conferred on individuals by Union provisions prohibiting 
discriminatory application of internal taxes or charges having an effect equivalent to customs 
duties.
33
 Due to the fact that unjust enrichment is a limitation of a subjective right derived 
from the Union legal order, it is understandable that the Court wishes to construe this 
exception narrowly.  
 Union law does not in principle prohibit the use of national principles by national 
authorities to the disadvantage of their citizens. However, the case Lady & Kid shows that the 
ECJ does not want – without stating this explicitly – an unrestricted use of it by the national 
governments. The ECJ emphasises that unjust enrichment in its strict sense – namely the 
direct passing on – is the one and only exception to the obligation of repayment. Every other 
broader explanation of unjust enrichment used in the advantage of the government must thus 
be rejected.  While the prohibition of the use of national principles by the national authorities 
is a step too far the ECJ feels somehow uncomfortable with regard to the use of principles by 
governments against citizens. Putting a burden on citizens on the ground of a legal principle 
without having a written legal basis is a delicate situation, especially regarding the area of 
taxation. 
 In former case law the ECJ has stated several times that the passing on depends on 
various factors in a specific commercial transaction that could defer from other transactions in 
other contexts. It was the task of the national courts to determine if a passing on was at stake 
in a concrete case.
34
 Where older jurisprudence left the door open for a national court to take 
unjust enrichment to have occurred in ways other than the incorporation of the charge into the 
price and thus direct passing on, the door is now completely shut. It is remarkable that the 
ECJ waived possible exceptions, other than direct passing on, without much scrutiny while 
the AG stated that the existing case law allows the exception to the entitlement to repayment 
to be extended to circumstances other than passing on (for example offsetting). 
 In the Accor case, the ECJ repeats what it has stated in Lady and Kid, namely that the 
right to a refund of charges levied in a Member State in breach of Union law is the 
consequence and complement of the right of individuals on the ground of Union law and that 
therefore a Member State must in principle repay unlawfully levied charges.
35
 Unjust 
enrichment – if it is understood as the direct passing on of charges by the taxable person to the 
purchaser – could, however, be a limit to repayment.
36
 An advance payment by a parent 
company when distributing dividends and not a charge levied on the sale of goods, does not 
by itself lead to the passing on of the advance payment to the purchaser. The ECJ is thus very 
clear in its case law concerning unjust enrichment. If there is no proof of direct passing on, the 
Member State cannot refuse the reimbursement of unduly paid taxes. Mitigation or reduction 
of the initial loss is thus not enough. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11365, para 93; Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11753, para 202 and 
Case C-309/06 Marks & Spencer [2008] ECR I-2283, para 30. 
33
 Case 199/82, San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, para 12 and Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 
Metallgesellschaft [2001] ECR I-1727, para 84. 
34
 Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb [1997] ECR I-165 and Case C-147/01 Weber’s Wine World 
[2003] ECR I-11365. 
35
 Case C-310/09 Accor SA [2011] ECR 0000, para 71. 
36
 ECJ C-310/09 Accor SA [2011] ECR 0000, para 72-74. 
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Future case law will show if the ECJ’s strict approach concerning unjust enrichment in 
(national) tax cases will have consequences for the unjust enrichment theory in other domains; 





The conclusion must be that unjust enrichment, as an exception to the right to the repayment 
of taxes and charges paid in breach of Union law, can only be successfully applied when the 
burden of the charge has been passed on to third parties. Although the repayment takes place 
under national procedures and national law, the ECJ set limits on the national court’s 
discretion. This it can justify as the guardian of subjective rights derived from Union law. 
Although governments can use their national principles to the disadvantage of citizens, the 
ECJ restricts this use in a serious way. The ECJ did not mention procedural autonomy or the 
European requirements of equivalence and effectiveness. This approach could be an 
apparition of the increasing convergence between the European and national unjust 
enrichment theory within the scope of Union law.     
                                                          
37
 F.ex. Case T-333/03 Masdar [2006] ECR II-4377 & Case C-47/07 P Masdar [2008] ECR I-9761. 
